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Abstract: Does democratic governance expand wealth and prosperity? There is no 
consensus about this issue despite the fact that for more than half a century, rival 
theories about the regime-growth relationship have been repeatedly tested against the 
empirical evidence, using a variety of cases, models and techniques. To consider the 
issues, Part I of this paper reviews and summarizes theories why regimes are expected to 
influence economic growth directly, either positively or negatively.  After considering 
these debates, Part II discusses the technical challenges facing research on this topic and 
how it is proposed to overcome these. Part III presents the results of the comparative 
analysis for the effects of democratic governance on economic growth during recent 
decades. The descriptive results illustrate the main relationships. The multivariate models 
check whether these patterns remain significant after controlling for many other factors 
associated with growth, including geography, economic conditions, social structural 
variables, cultural legacies, and global trends. The evidence supports the equilibrium 
thesis suggesting that regimes combining both liberal democracy and bureaucratic 
governance are most likely to generate growth, while by contrast patronage autocracies 
display the worst economic performance. The conclusion considers the implications. 
Keywords: Political regimes, democracy, governance, economic growth, development 
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Does democratic governance expand wealth?  This question has long been at 
the heart of intense debates in the social sciences and among policymakers. Since 
billions of people continue to live in poverty, understanding this issue is vitally 
important. In recent decades, international organizations have devoted growing 
resources to strengthening regimes; hence the World Bank now emphasizes that 
countries with so-called ‘good governance’ are more likely to attract investment in 
human and physical capital, and thus generate the conditions thought favorable to 
long-term prosperity.1 The Bank’s programs have worked with country partners to 
strengthen mechanisms designed to strengthen the transparency of decision-making 
and the accountability of public officials, including control of corruption, legal 
mechanisms securing property and contractual rights, the independent media and 
civil society organizations, the conditions of basic security and order, and capacity 
building of public sector management.2 Elsewhere this perspective has influenced 
development agencies, notably the United States Millennium Challenge Account, 
which uses the quality of governance as a condition for the allocation of additional 
aid.3 Similarly the assumption that democratic governance generates both growth and 
welfare (and thus potential achievement of the Millennium Development Goals) has 
strongly influenced strategic priorities within many United Nations agencies and 
bureaus. 4  Hence the United Nations Development Programme used to focus on 
providing technical assistance and capacity building for public administration reform; 
since 2002, however, work on democratic governance has expanded in scope and size 
to the point where this focus area absorbs almost half the organization’s total budget. 
UNDP supports one in three parliaments in the developing world and an election 
every two weeks.  In 2010, UNDP helped over 130 countries and devoted US$1.18 
billion in resources to democratic governance, making UNDP the world's largest 
provider of democratic governance assistance.5 
Given this investment of resources, it is vitally important to understanding 
the role of regime institutions in spurring economic growth, improving living 
standards and alleviating poverty. For more than half a century, rival theories about 
the regime-growth relationship have been repeatedly tested against the empirical 
evidence, using a variety of cases, models and techniques.  Scholars have examined 
evidence throughout the third wave era and by now a substantial research literature 
has now emerged investigating this relationship, both in regional studies as well as 
comparisons of global trends. 6 Despite repeated and imaginative attempts to do so, 
many technical challenges arise when seeking to establish conclusive proof. Partial 
agreement is starting to emerge about some of the observable empirical regularities, 
but even here the complex reciprocal linkages between regime institutions and 
growth means that consensus is far from complete. For some, neo-liberal ‘good’ 
governance institutions such as property rights and rule of law (but not democracy) 
do indeed facilitate growth in per capita GDP.7 For others, however, growth is the 
key driver of the quality of democratic governance.8   For still others, any relationship 
is modified by certain conditions, whether the specific type of constitutional design, 
how long institutions have been established, a specific threshold level of 
development, or the type of societal culture within which institutions are embedded. 
Studies of the relationship between democracy and growth generate results which are 
highly sensitive to technical specifications and the comparative framework, hence 
findings have failed to prove robust when replicated using a different range of 
nations or with models employing alternative indicators and methods. 9 Moreover 
claims that ‘institutions matter’ are constructed at a highly abstract level and theories 
identifying the intermediate mechanisms linking regimes and growth, and thus our NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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capacity to offer policy-relevant recommendations, remain under-specified and 
poorly understood. Equally importantly, most studies have analyzed the impact of 
either democracy or governance, but the comparison of both of these twin 
phenomena has been neglected. For all these reasons, previous research needs to be 
revisited to establish more robust and precise generalizations.  
The structure of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I reviews and 
summarizes theories why regimes are expected to influence economic growth 
directly, either positively or negatively.  After considering these debates, Part II 
discusses the technical challenges facing research on this topic and how it is proposed 
to overcome these. Part III presents the results of the comparative analysis for the 
effects of democratic governance on economic growth during recent decades. The 
descriptive results illustrate the relationship between regimes and growth. The 
multivariate models check whether these patterns remain significant after controlling 
for other factors associated with growth and governance, including geography, 
economic conditions, social structural variables, cultural legacies, and global trends. 
The evidence supports the equilibrium thesis suggesting that regimes combining both 
liberal democracy and bureaucratic governance are most likely to generate growth, 
while by contrast patronage autocracies display the worst economic performance. 
The conclusion in Part IV summarizes the findings and implications. 
I: Theories linking regimes with economic growth 
Several distinctive theoretical perspectives can be identified concerning the 
regime-growth relationship. Skeptics believe that regime institutions are unable to 
exert significant independent effects on growth (the null hypothesis) compared with 
many standard factors commonly emphasized in the research literature. While 
societal modernization is expected to strengthen processes of democratization and 
investment in the quality of governance institutions, in the skeptical view the reverse 
relationship does not hold.  These views are challenged by equilibrium theory, which 
posits that economic growth is strengthened by regimes combining liberal democratic 
institutions (reinforcing channels of electoral accountability) with bureaucratic 
governance (and thus state capacity for effective macro-economic management).   
These claims are compared against those of other scholars who offer a number of 
reasons why the institutions of either governance (for realists) or those of liberal 
democracy (for idealists) are expected to influence income. There is no single 
perspective within each of these schools of thought. Several potential linkage 
mechanisms are suggested in the previous literature, each emphasizing a different 
underlying connection. After reviewing the arguments, the cross-national time-series 
evidence allows us to test each of these accounts, comparing equilibrium theory 
against its rivals. 
The skeptical ‘null hypothesis’ 
The traditional economics literature seeking to identify the ‘deep’ or 
‘fundamental’ determinants of economic performance suggests that growth is 
affected by a multitude of complex factors. Economists typically emphasize levels of 
investment in human and physical capital and societal infrastructure (schools, roads, 
communications), openness to trade (and thus export-led growth of goods and 
commodities), geography (climate, location, type of agriculture, risk of tropical 
disease, and access to neighboring markets), the diffusion of access to technological 
innovations, the distribution of natural resources (such as minerals, oil and gas), 
social structure (including the size of the labor force, levels of social inequality and NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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ethnic divisions), and the cultural values which predominate in any society.10 There is 
a broad consensus that countries which invest more, develop new technologies, and 
have better infrastructures are expected to grow more successfully.  
By contrast, the precise role of formal institutions as part of this process, and 
which types of institutions are important, remains under dispute in the contemporary 
research literature. Ever since Douglas North’s seminal contribution, some 
economists claim that ‘institutions rule’, emphasizing the contribution of rule of law, 
private property rights and control of corruption to growth.11  An influential study by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson argues that in former European colonies, colonial 
settler mortality rates serve as a proxy for the quality of contemporary political 
institutions.12  The conditions in the colonies, they reason, were vital for early 
institution-building, laying the foundations for modern contract law, secure property 
rights, and human capital, all of which provide the foundations for flourishing 
markets and effective states. Yet several scholars reverse their interpretation of the 
relationship, on the grounds that institutions such as effective and clean 
administration in the public sector, rule of law, and respect for property rights are 
probably the consequence, rather than the cause, of economic growth. 13  Glaeser et 
al argue that the Europeans who settled in the new World may have brought their 
human capital with them (the skills and capacities derived from literacy and 
schooling), rather than their legal institutions. Since human capital is a strong 
predictor of economic growth, they argue that predictors of settlement patterns are 
not valid instruments for political institutions.14 Charron and Lapuente argue that any 
relationship runs from growth to governance; growing prosperity is thought to 
expand the resources available to invest in the quality of bureaucratic governance and 
the administration of public services, as well as public demands for these services. 15 
Therefore although ‘good governance’ has now become fashionable in the international 
development community, the robustness of the empirical findings claiming that 
institutions matter for income continues to be debated, compared with many other 
deep drivers of prosperity. 
At the same time, many doubt whether democracy exerts a significant 
independent effect upon economic prosperity; democratic regimes can be rich 
(Sweden) or poor (Mali). Similarly autocracies vary from the resurgent growth and 
experienced by China and Viet Nam to the economic stagnation or decline which is 
evident in North Korea or Zimbabwe. Support for the skeptical perspective is found 
in much of the empirical evidence. Thus although some research reports that the 
institutions of liberal democracy have a positive impact on economic growth, most 
studies suggest a negative relationship, or indeed no significant relationship at all.16  A 
widely cited early study by Robert Barro reported that growth was strengthened by 
maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and 
high human capital. Once models control for these kinds of variables, and the initial 
level of real per-capita GDP was held constant, then the overall additional effect of 
liberal democratic regimes on growth proved weakly negative.17   The skeptical 
perspective was reinforced by one of the most comprehensive studies, by Adam 
Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, which 
compared the experience of economic and political development in 141 countries 
from 1950 to 1990.18  Democratic and autocratic regimes were classified according to 
Schumpeterian rules of electoral contestation. The study concluded that according to 
this measure, democracies proved no better (but also no worse) than dictatorships at 
generating economic growth. Among poor countries, as well, the type of regime NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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made no difference for growth. “In countries with incomes below $3000, the two regimes have 
almost identical investment shares, almost identical rates of growth of capital stock and of labor force, 
the same production function, the same contributions of capital, labor, and factor productivity to 
growth, the same output per worker, the same labor shares, and the same product wages…Regimes 
make no difference for growth, quantitatively or qualitatively.” 19 The most recent 
comprehensive review of the research literature, by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 
compared and summarized 84 studies published on the regime-growth relationship.20  
Not surprisingly, their meta-analysis noted that estimates of the regime-growth 
relationship differed across this wide range of studies, due to varied data sources, 
techniques, control variables, country coverage, and time periods. Overall, however, 
the study concluded that liberal democracy exerts no direct impact on prosperity, 
either positively or negatively.  Some indirect regime effects were observed, however, 
since liberal democracies invest more in human capital and have greater political 
stability, both of which are thought to strengthened growth. If the skeptical view is 
indeed correct, then the empirical evidence should demonstrate that the prior type of 
regime makes little significant difference, positive or negative, to subsequent levels of 
economic growth. 
The effects of governance on growth 
The skeptical view about the positive role of regimes for growth has not 
been confined to academic studies; in the past, it also permeated the international 
development community. During the 1970s and 1980s, the first-generation 
‘Washington Consensus’ advocated by the agencies of global finance, based on neo-
classical theories in political economy, explained prosperity as a product of market 
forces; countries seeking to expand production output and export-led growth were 
advised to end protectionism and open borders to international trade, attract 
investment capital, allow competitive exchange rates, develop human capital, adapt to 
technological progress, deregulate the economy, and enlarge the labor force.  In the 
neo-classical view, the state was regarded as hindering growth in the private sector if 
it ventured beyond strictly minimal Smithsonian functions of providing security, 
infrastructure, and protection of property rights. The predatory or bloated state was 
seen as problematic for growth, especially macroeconomic policies involving public 
sector ownership of industry, massive budget deficits, negative interest rates, 
protectionist restrictions on free trade, over-regulation, endemic corruption, and 
inadequate basic public services.21  Tax reform, privatization, trade liberalization, anti-
corruption measures, and fiscal austerity were the prescribed medicine to cure these 
ailments.  It was believed that the state had to get out of the way, to let unfettered 
markets achieve growth most efficiently. In the rush to liberalize public-sector 
ownership and shrink the size of the state, little attention was paid to the capacity of 
government, whether to regulate the privatization process and prevent the emergence 
of new oligopolies, to provide security, to manage the delivery of other basic goods 
and services, to plan and implement policies, and to enforce laws. 
The first-generation Washington consensus therefore held that good 
economic performance required liberalized trade, macroeconomic stability, and 
getting prices right. In subsequent years, however, the revised second-generation 
Washington consensus came to acknowledge the dangers of radical structural 
adjustment, including growing social inequality, market failures, and corruption, and 
the important positive role of the state in development. 22 Many factors contributed 
towards this revised philosophy. Latin American countries, which had embraced the 
menu of liberalization, often failed to achieve stable and equitable economic growth. NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
 
6 
 
Economists in the region started to address the institutional reforms needed to tackle 
social inequality and substantial improvements in living standards for the poor.23 
Experience in Eastern Europe, especially Russia, demonstrated that shock therapy 
and selling off public sector assets in countries lacking rule of law and control of 
corruption merely transferred state power to business oligarchs and reinforced crony 
capitalism.   The fall of the Berlin Wall, and transitions from autocracy elsewhere in 
the world, spurred renewed interest in understanding the economic consequences of 
processes of democratization and constitutional arrangements, as well as providing 
new opportunities for institutional reform.  The 1997 Asian economic crisis, in 
countries which had liberalized their economies, created new challenges to the 
standard prescriptions.24 Most recently, doubts about the wisdom of unregulated 
markets have been reinforced by the financial downturn catalyzed by the bursting 
housing bubble and banking crisis in the United States, before quickly infecting debt-
ridden economies in Mediterranean Europe and beyond. 25  
Neo-liberal claims for ‘good governance’ 
The second-generation Washington Consensus, emerging in response to all 
these developments, recognized that effective state institutions and the quality of 
governance can function as ‘deep drivers’ which supplement markets and thereby 
also contribute positively towards economic growth. 26  The good governance 
perspective became popular following seminal work published during the early-1990s 
by Douglas North, the Nobel prize-winning economist, leading scholars of 
development to rediscover the importance of ‘institutions’, understood as both 
formal legal regulations and informal patterned social interactions, cultural traditions, 
and social norms determining mechanisms of social cooperation and how authority is 
exercised.27 The substantial body of empirical literature which has emerged in 
economics in recent decades has reinforced the claim that certain types of neo-liberal 
governance institutions are critical for development. Research started to explore 
some of the empirical evidence, including a seminal paper by Mauro documenting the 
links between corruption and growth.28 This paper stimulated a substantial body of 
work replicating and expanding these core findings, using many types of economic 
indices and measures of corruption.29 Another early study by Knack and Keefer 
reported that the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings of the quality of 
governance were directly related to growth of per capita income.30  
This work highlighted the need for cross-national and time-series indicators 
capable of monitoring institutional quality. From 1996 onwards, Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi at the World Bank Institute developed 
composite estimates for all countries worldwide covering six dimensions of so called 
‘good governance’, including perceptions of rule of law, control of corruption, voice 
and accountability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and political stability, 
derived from expert polls and public opinion surveys conducted by multiple 
organizations.31 This evidence seemed to provide empirical support for the neo-
liberal perspective emphasizing the importance of good governance institutions, 
especially those strengthening control of corruption, property rights, and rule of law.  
In a series of papers, Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues have drawn upon the World 
Bank Institute indices as evidence to argue that ‘good governance’ generates 
substantial pay-offs for the economy: “A country that improves its governance from a 
relatively low level to an average level could almost triple the per capita income of its population in the 
long-term.”  32 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson strengthened this argument, using  
colonial settler mortality rates serve as instrument for the quality of contemporary NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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political institutions.33  Using this measure, Rodrik, Subrahanian and Trebbi also 
conclude that rule of law and security of property rights are both deep determinants 
of economic growth, controlling for the effects of geography and trade.34  These 
particular institutions are believed to underpin free markets, investor confidence, and 
contract enforcement.  Neo-liberals therefore emphasize that income growth is 
facilitated by specific types of institutions which are thought to reduce the risks and 
barriers that investors face in the marketplace. If this claim is true, then growth rates 
should be strongly linked with several specific indices of ‘good’ governance, in particular the WBI 
estimates of Rule of Law, Property Rights, and Control of Corruption.  
The effects of state capacity on growth 
Yet good governance is an abstract and vague term which is open to 
alternative interpretations. Following the ‘institutional turn’ in economics, other 
leading scholars have renewed the emphasis on the role of formal rules, but good 
governance has been interpreted from a more Keynesian or social democratic 
perspective. Hence the Nobel prize-winner Joseph Stigletz advocated a more 
interventionist role for the state in the economy, using the strategic levers of 
regulatory institutions, social insurance programs, fiscal and monetary policies, above 
and beyond ensuring the conditions for free markets through protecting private 
property rights and rule of law. 35  Francis Fukuyama led realist thinking by 
emphasized the urgent need for state-building and well-functioning public 
administration, on the grounds that weak states are the source of many of the world’s 
problems, from poverty to AIDS, terrorism and drugs.36 Public sector reform was 
needed, Fukuyama argues, for effective state capacity, even though the scope and 
functions of the state needed to be limited. By contrast, Fukuyama argues that 
democracy and human rights do not deserve equal priority for the international 
development community, except perhaps as a way to legitimize states.37   
If it is recognized that governments need to play an effective role in 
economic development -- through regulating the market economy, implementing 
laws and policies, planning budgets, and managing the delivery of public goods and 
services -- then their ability to do so rests, in large part, upon the professional skills, 
procedural culture, and technical capacity of the public sector. Presenting empirical 
support this view, Evans and Rauch documented the link between estimates of the 
quality of ‘Weberian bureaucracy’ and economic growth. The study compared almost 
three-dozen developing societies from 1970 to 1990, measuring perceptions of the 
quality of bureaucratic governance from an expert survey. The results showed that 
states where the civil service in the core economic agencies had meritocratic 
recruitment processes, and predictable career ladders, enjoyed greater prosperity, 
after controlling for initial levels of per capita GDP and human capital.38  
Many case studies are also often cited to support the claim that the 
implementation of effective development policies requires competent public 
administration and a strong and effective state. This argument is believed to be 
exemplified by the remarkable growth and rapid industrialization enjoyed in the East 
Asian tiger economies of Taiwan, Singapore, China, and South Korea, leading some 
observers to posit a sequential process of ‘economic development first, democracy 
second’. 39 The case of Singapore is commonly thought to illustrate the Asian model 
of development, combining both economic success and social stability, and thus the 
presumed advantages of bureaucratic autocracies. Singapore has become one of the 
most affluent nations around the world, ranked 23rd highest on the 2009 Human NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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Development Index, just behind Germany and ahead of Greece, Israel and Portugal. 
The Singapore economy, built upon the service-sector, particularly finance, banking, 
investment, and trade, has forged ahead despite a lack of natural resources.   In 2009, 
Singapore produced a per capita GDP of around $37,000 (in PPP), similar to Italy 
and Japan. An autocracy ruled by one predominant party, and with limited political 
rights and freedoms, bureaucratic governance in the island state is widely regarded as 
both efficient and effective. 40 
China is an even more striking case, enjoying an average annual growth rate 
of 10 percent over the last three decades, a rate maintained despite the 2008 global 
financial crisis which has afflicted advanced economies, especially the United States 
and the euro zone. In 1980, the average per capita income in China was $251 (with 
the nation ranked 4th last worldwide).41 By 2010, this figure had risen to $7,240 
(ranked 89th from the bottom). China is widely regarded as challenging the standard 
neo-liberal conventional wisdom that free markets, state deregulation, and secure 
private property rights are vital for growth. 42 The political stability found in 
bureaucratic autocracies is believed to encourage the process of rapid 
industrialization and thus facilitate sustainable economic growth. Yet the evidence for 
administrative competence in East Asian states does not always tell a consistent story 
supporting these claims; the Republic of Korea, for example, experienced serious 
problems of corruption and crony capitalism for many decades during its long period 
of economic development, although in recent years this has greatly diminished.43  If 
the core argument is correct, however, it suggests that the quality of bureaucratic 
governance in any country should significantly affect subsequent levels of economic growth. 
The effects of democracy on growth 
Accountability: Elections reward competent economic management 
Skeptical claims that democracy fails to exert an independent effect upon 
economic development, compared with other structural determinants, are also 
challenged by idealist arguments. The most common argument in this perspective 
suggests that democracies are usually more successful at generating economic growth 
since competitive elections provide an automatic fail-safe mechanism for removing 
incompetent leaders; governing parties perceived by citizens as successful at 
managing the economy are usually returned to office, while ineffective 
administrations are kicked out. Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein argue that in this 
regard democracies have a ‘self-correcting mechanism’.44  By contrast, no such 
regular and peaceful channel exists in autocracies to remove inept, repressive, or 
venal leaders. As Fukuyama points out, autocracies have variable economic 
performance; states may be ruled by a Lee Kwan Yew but they may also be run by a 
Mobutu or a Marcos or a Gaddafi.45 
The accountability argument builds upon several well-established theories in 
the literature, including (i) the Schumpeterian conception of democracy, emphasizing 
the role of elections as core mechanisms in democracy for the expression of public 
preferences, government accountability, and political responsiveness;  (ii) Downsian 
theories suggesting that rational voters cast ballots seeking to maximize their utility,  
as well as (iii) theories of retrospective voting, emphasizing that in democratic states, 
citizens evaluate the economic performance of the governing party and leader, 
rewarding or punishing them accordingly at the ballot box.46 This last line of thought 
suggests that particular elections in each country can revolve around the 
government’s record on a wide range of issues on the policy agenda but overall many NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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contests are thought to be won or lost based on public evaluations of the governing 
party or parties’ competence in managing bread-and-butter economic conditions.47 
Poor government results at the ballot box have commonly been attributed to 
conditions of unemployment, inflation, or poor growth, in contests where “it’s the 
economy, stupid”. 48  Vote-seeking politicians thus have a strong incentive to manage 
the economy effectively and to offer alternative policies which appeal to the majority 
of the electorate.49 Parties and leaders demonstrating a competent record are 
expected to be most consistently returned to steer the nation’s economy, while those 
with a poor performance are usually less successful in gaining power.  By contrast, 
autocrats face no such electoral sanction; citizens have little power to get rid of 
ineffective leaders, short of violent means, in countries such as Zimbabwe, Somalia 
and Libya, despite public disaffection with declining incomes, endemic poverty, and 
worsening living standards.  50 If these claims are true, when tested against the 
empirical evidence, levels of democratization should predict subsequent levels of economic growth. 
Some limited evidence supports this claim; for example Halperin, Siegle and 
Weinstein compared the economic performance of poorer societies (defined as those 
below $2000 per capita) from 1960 to 2005 and found that democracies consistently 
enjoyed higher per capita growth rates than autocracies. Moreover when all countries 
are considered, they report that democracies have realized consistently higher levels 
of economic growth than autocracies during the last five decades.51 Yet many other 
characteristics of democratic societies, not controlled in their models, may be driving 
these observations. The claim that democratic regimes are more positive for growth 
has also been strongly challenged. Hence drawing upon experience of development in 
Latin America, Guillermo O’Donnell, argued that the early stages of any democratic 
transition in the region were often characterized by weaker governance capacity, and 
thus greater instability and uncertainty, inflationary pressures on the state, and a rise 
in distributional conflict, heightening the risks facing international investors.52 By 
contrast he emphasized that states with effective bureaucracies and strong executives 
had the capacity to respond promptly and decisively when managing the economy, 
especially during crisis conditions.   
Do democracies strengthen human capital with indirect effects on growth? 
Another reason why the type of regime may affect growth indirectly, idealists 
suggest, is through investment in the labor force. Human capital is widely regarded as 
important for growth; higher levels of literacy, schooling and vocational training 
produce a more productive workforce, a process which is thought especially 
important given the demands of modern technologies and the need for skills in 
service sector jobs.53 Several studies have now reported that liberal democracies 
invest more in primary and secondary education and vocational training – and they 
also achieve better attainment outcomes. 54 According to Halperin, Siegle and 
Weinstein, for example, among low-income economies, democracies have typically 
realized secondary school enrollment levels 40% higher than autocracies.55 Moreover 
studies relate education with growth; based on a panel study of 100 countries from 
1965 to 1995, Barro reports that growth is affected by the average years of school 
attainment of adult men at secondary and higher levels.56 The human capital 
argument focuses upon schooling attainment, literacy, and tertiary training, all 
thought important for a productive and skilled labor-force. If liberal democracies do 
invest more in human capital, and if this process has an indirect effect on prosperity, 
as several studies suggest, then the type of democratic regime combined with the gross enrollment 
rates of secondary-level education should expand wealth.  Nevertheless this claim also remains NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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under debate in the literature.  In particular, questions remain when determining the 
direction of causality in any relationship, since the classic ‘Lipset’ thesis claims that 
the expansion of education and literacy are some of the key features of industrial 
societies which facilitate democratization. Barro confirmed that access to primary 
schooling, and a smaller gender gap in educational attainment, both strengthened the 
propensity for democracy.57 Hence it is critical to try to disentangle any complex 
correlations linking the type of regime, levels of human capital, and income growth.  
Do power-sharing democracies promote growth? 
Several scholars emphasize that beyond the regime, the specific type of 
democratic institutions matters for accountability. Constitutional arrangements vary 
among democracies and major contrasts include those arising among majoritarian-
plurality, mixed, or proportional electoral systems; presidential, mixed, or 
parliamentary executives; single party or coalitional party governments; and federal or 
unitary states. Each of these categories also contains many important variations, for 
example PR electoral systems differ by their use of open or closed lists, the level of 
any formal vote threshold, and the type of vote formula.58 Similarly the constitutional 
powers and responsibilities of presidents and prime ministers vary substantially, 
especially in ‘mixed’ executives which combine both roles. Rather than the type of 
regime, several scholars emphasize that the particular constitutional arrangements 
matter for economic performance.59  In a series of studies, Persson and Tabellini 
suggest that constitutional variations such as states with presidential or parliamentary 
executives influence economic performance, including fiscal policies, trade policies, 
and levels of public spending, and thus have an indirect effect upon growth. They 
conclude that the type of electoral systems does not affect economic performance 
but parliamentary government is associated with growth-promoting policies, such as 
open trade and property protection rights.60 By contrast, Knutsen reports that 
proportional and semi-proportional electoral rules do produce substantially higher 
annual per capita growth rates compared with plural-majoritarian rules.61   
If types of institutional arrangements affect prosperity, however, the exact 
reasons behind any observed regularities still need to be established.    One argument 
emphasizes that parliamentary executives and majoritarian elections commonly 
produce single-party governments, where management of the economy rests in the 
hands of the leader of the governing party.62 This process has certain advantages for 
establishing a clear chain of electoral accountability, where the team of cabinet 
ministers for the governing party is collectively responsible for economic 
performance, while individual representatives of the governing party are also 
accountable to local single-member constituencies. This arrangement facilitates public 
evaluations (‘the buck stops here’) and thus retrospective economic voting at the 
ballot box. Similarly, unitary and centralized states also strengthen the direct chain of 
electoral accountability.63 By contrast, electoral accountability is weakened in 
presidential and mixed executives, in proportional electoral systems which usually 
generate coalition governments, and in federal states. Where party control is divided 
among the major branches of the legislature and executive it becomes more difficult 
for citizens to attribute clear praise or blame for management of economic 
performance.64 The attribution of responsibility is further reduced under conditions 
of multi-level governance and economic globalization; problems with the American 
sub-prime mortgage triggered the banking crisis in 2008, so who should citizens in 
Greece, Ireland, and Iceland blame for their economic woes: their own leaders, or 
those in the United States, or indeed the actions of the major multinational financial NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
 
11 
 
corporations and international agencies? According to this view, power-concentrating 
constitutional arrangements (with plurality or majoritarian electoral systems, 
parliamentary executives, and unitary states) should produce the clearest chain of 
responsibility and the strongest electoral incentives for governing parties to manage 
the economy competently and well. 
At the same time, however, an alternative line of reasoning suggests that 
power-sharing democracies may promote greater macroeconomic policy stability. 
Lijphart suggests that under these arrangements, decision-making require greater 
compromise establishing agreement among the multiple coalition parties in 
government. 65  This is predicted to generate greater stability, moderation, and 
continuity in medium and long-term macro-economic policy, which, in turn, is 
expected to expand business confidence, reduce investment risks, and improve 
prosperity. 66  By contrast, majoritarian democracies with single-party governments 
are thought more vulnerable to abrupt policy reversals following major shifts in party 
fortunes. Under these arrangements, such as historically in the UK and Australia, 
sudden ‘stop-go’ reversals in macroeconomic policies are possible when the major 
parties on the left and right rotate in government office, such as switches in fiscal 
policy and public spending, trade union bargaining rights, or economic deregulation. 
Abrupt macro-economic policy reversals and instability are thought to be problematic 
for investors, creating uncertainty and thereby heightening risk.   
Thus there are several plausible reasons why power-sharing institutions may 
matter for growth, but debate continues about the underlying mechanism and the 
predicted effects. Theories identify rival pathways but it is not clear whether electoral 
accountability or political stability is more important for income. If democratic 
effects on growth are conditional,  then growth should be observed to vary by the type of 
institutional arrangements (including whether states are federal or unified, whether 
electoral systems are proportional or not proportional, and whether the type of 
executive is parliamentary or not). Nevertheless the state of knowledge about these 
relationships does not allow us to predict the direction of any effects with any degree 
of confidence. Moreover the complexity of alternative constitutional arrangements 
and diverse channels of electoral accountability means that coding institutions into 
proxy dichotomous categories loses much find-grained detail about how institutions 
work in practice. 
Equilibrium theory and democratic governance 
Lastly in counter-balance to all these claims, the equilibrium argument 
suggests that previous claims need to be synthesized into a unified theory where the 
combination of both liberal democracy and governance capacity is understood as 
contributing towards economic growth.67 In particular, electoral accountability 
increases the pressures on governments to deliver an effective performance, but 
public officials can only do so if the state has the technical capacity and skills to 
manage macroeconomic policies. If government leaders are thrown out of office for 
failing to improve the economy, but opposition parties are similarly unable to reduce 
levels of inflation and unemployment, then the result are likely to deepen 
disillusionment with the political process.68 If economic problems continue over 
successive administrations, then disenchantment may spread so that the public comes 
to lack confidence in the regime, and ultimately, faith in democratic ideals and 
principles. On the other hand, if state officials are competent and effective at 
managing economic growth, expanding the country’s GDP, but government leaders NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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are not responsive and accountable to citizens, then there is no mechanism which 
makes sure that wealth trickles down to benefit the living standards of the general 
public rather than the Swiss bank accounts of economic elites. For these reasons, 
equilibrium thesis suggests that the combination of liberal democracy and governance capacity 
will prove the most effective recipe for growth. 
II: The research design 
The previous body of research therefore suggests several propositions which 
can be tested in this study. The empirical evidence needs to be reexamined cautiously, 
however, due to the series of technical challenges facing any systematic study of this 
relationship. This includes issues of reciprocal causality, omitted variable bias, invalid 
conceptualization, measurement errors, and bias arising from missing data.  
First, major difficulties arise from complex issues of reciprocal causality; 
regimes may facilitate growth. But economic development is also widely believed to 
provide conditions conducive both to processes of democratization and to 
strengthening investment in the quality of governance.69  A large body of economic 
and sociological research has observed that wealthy societies have usually been more 
democratic. The political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset laid the groundwork for 
this perspective, specifying that: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it 
will sustain democracy.” 70 Greater affluence consolidates democracy, Lipset theorized, 
by expanding levels of human capital (literacy, schooling), widening media access, 
broadening the middle classes, dampening the effects of extreme poverty, facilitating 
intermediary civil society organizations, such as labor unions and professional 
associations, and promoting the cultural values of democratic legitimacy and social 
tolerance.71 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that in the short-term the 
direction of causality runs from development to governance, rather than the reverse, 
controlling for country fixed-effects,  although they acknowledge that in the long-
term (over the last 500 years) there is a positive correlation between economic 
development and processes of democratization.72 To mitigate the effects of reversed 
causation, the measures for the independent variables are taken for the year before 
the annual measure of economic growth. I also include measures of levels of 
economic development from previous years; this makes sense if growth is 
understood as a sticky phenomenon which is not invented anew every year. Past 
growth can be expected to strengthen future growth. The measure of income also 
helps to capture all the accumulated factors which have expanded growth until the 
current observation and which are unobserved in the models. 
In parsimonious but under-specified models, omitted variable bias may also 
prove problematic; another independent variable, not included in controls, may 
determine simultaneously both the type of regime and levels of economic growth. 
For example, developing societies meeting international standards of good 
governance and democracy are more likely to attract international aid as well as 
international private-sector investment.73  As a result, states with well-governed 
democracies may experience faster growth than those with autocratic regimes, but 
this should not be attributed directly to how different types of regimes manage their 
economies. Many studies of economic growth analyze the importance of institutions, 
trade and geography, but fail to control for social structural factors, such as levels of 
ethnic fractionalization or income inequality, as well as the potential role of civil wars 
and inter-state conflict, all of which can be expected to depress growth. Econometric 
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power-concentrating democratic institutions, which can be expected to differ in their 
economic effects. 74 Many parsimonious economic models are elegant but under-
specified. To guard against this tendency, by contrast this study uses a battery of 
items to control for several sets of factors: constitutional arrangements, prior 
economic conditions, geography, social structure, cultural traditions, and global 
trends (see Table 5.1).  Moreover, many models examine the impact of either 
democracy or governance, but not the interaction of both phenomena.  
Thirdly, other difficulties arise from poor conceptualization and measurement errors; 
a growing consensus has arisen today about standard indicators of liberal democracy, 
using the Gastil Index from Freedom House and the Polity IV democracy-autocracy 
scale.75 Notions of ‘good governance’ still remain vague and poorly defined, however, 
and the available empirical indicators may well be invalid measures of the overarching 
concepts.76  The World Bank Institute good governance indices are widely employed, 
in both theoretical and applied policy research but they have been criticized as 
suffering from problems of perceptual biases, adverse selection in sampling, and 
conceptual conflation with economic policy choices. 77 For example, the WBI indices 
include ‘regulatory quality’ based on the assumption that minimal intervention is 
optimal, yet this conflates specific controversial policy prescriptions with the quality 
of governance. Many of the indices are actually outcome measures of good 
governance, rather than ‘input’ or process measures; for example control of 
corruption is widely recognized as important for growth, but estimates arising from 
broad and abstract measures do not tell us anything about what government 
procedures, institutions or policies actually work to minimize corruption. There are 
potential problems arising from all perceptual measures of governance performance, 
especially those based on unrepresented groups of elites such as business-people, 
academics, and journalists, since favorable outcomes (such as conditions of economic 
growth) can color evaluations of the quality of governance. This can prove 
particularly problematic with the analysis of cross-national data, since growth rates 
may be spuriously correlated with perceptions of good governance. Longitudinal 
analysis is needed but the WBI indices only started to be estimated in 1996. Many 
studies have also emphasized the importance of ‘rule of law’ for development, but 
this abstract and vague idea contains multiple components. 78 If ‘rule of law’ matters, 
it is still unclear whether policymakers heeding these lessons should seek to 
strengthen the independence of the courts and judiciary, develop procedures and 
institutions designed to control corruption, expand professional training and capacity 
building for lawyers, prioritize police protection of person and property, expand 
access to transitional justice, or engage in the demilitarization of security forces, or ‘all 
of the above’.  The underlying institutional mechanisms, and the policy implications 
arising from the governance research literature, thus remain under-specified and 
poorly understood.  To overcome problems of measurement error, this study tests 
the robustness of key relationships using alternative measures of liberal democracy 
and bureaucratic governance. 
Lastly, potential problems of systematic bias arise from missing data in the 
longitudinal and cross-national analysis of development indices. Moreover the 
missing data is often not randomly distributed; instead it is most common in poorer 
nations, in societies deeply-divided by conflict, and in patronage autocracies. In these 
contexts, national statistical offices often lack the resources, technical capacity, or 
political-independence to gather reliable internationally-standardized statistics from 
official statistics, regular household surveys, or census data, even for basic indices NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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monitoring progress for the MDGs. Unfortunately other systematic biases can also 
arise from standard social science datasets; for example, one of the standard 
indicators of democracy is provided by the Polity IV series classifying regimes since 
1800, but this dataset excludes all micro-states around the world (with populations 
below 500,000).  Polity IV covers 164 independent nation-states worldwide, with the 
biases already noted arising from the exclusion of micro-states.  International 
statistics also rarely monitor data from dependent territories, such as Montenegro, 
Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, so that time-series data of past trends is lacking when 
these societies gain independent statehood. Consequently major problems can arise 
from the limited country coverage included in cross-national and time-series 
comparisons, since the independent nation-states included in the analysis are not a 
random sample of all countries in the world. Many of the governance indices are also 
relatively recent in origin, covering the period since the mid-1980s (ICRG) or since 
the mid-1990s (WBI), hence long-term processes are difficult to determine. To 
mitigate problems arising from systematic bias, this study compares the robustness of 
the results using alternative indices with different country coverage. 
To examine the evidence, this study uses a mixed research strategy. First we 
can examine the descriptive statistics to observe the general patterns. The regime 
classification is based on the Freedom House liberal democracy index and the ICRG 
bureaucratic governance index which are both standardized to 100 point scales and 
dichotomized around the mean to create a four-fold typology. This distinguishes 
regimes which are bureaucratic democracies, bureaucratic autocracies, patronage 
democracies and patronage democracies.79 Multivariate models can then analyze 
cross-national time-series panel data for countries worldwide, to determine the 
predicted impact of liberal democracy and bureaucratic governance indices upon 
changes in economic growth, incorporating a wide range of controls. Change in per 
capita GDP is measured in purchasing power parity, derived here from the chain 
series provided by the Penn World Tables.80  Models examine the effects of the 
Freedom House Gastil index of democracy, providing the most comprehensive 
country coverage of all independent nation-states.  The quality of Bureaucratic 
Governance is gauged using the ICRG annual estimates which are available for a 
more restricted range of 134 countries since 1984. Both these indices are 
standardized to 100-point scales, for comparability and ease of interpreting the 
results.   To monitor conditional effects arising from particular types of power-
sharing constitutions, the models also classify whether countries are federal or unitary 
states, whether the electoral system used for the lower house of the national 
parliament is proportional representation or not, and the type of presidential or 
parliamentary executive.81 A series of comprehensive controls (see Table 5.1) are 
introduced for the effects on growth arising from economic factors, geographic 
characteristics, social structural variables, cultural traditions, and global trends.  The 
panel models employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with panel corrected 
errors, to correct the problem of serial correlation arising from repeated observations 
of the same countries over time. Robustness checks replicate the models to compare 
the results using the alternative Polity IV scale of democracy-autocracy.   
III. The effects of regimes on growth 
First, does growth vary systematically by the type of regime? To look initially 
at the descriptive data, Figure 5.1 compares mean levels of annual economic growth 
during the whole period under review (from 1984 to 2007) for each type of regime, 
without any prior controls. The results confirm that bureaucratic democracies experienced NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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the highest annual rates of per capita growth (2.49%), as well as the most stable growth rates 
(StDev = 3.92). Equilibrium theory predicts that bureaucratic democracies combine 
the most effective macro-economic management by the state, with competent and 
technically-skilled officials steering the economy in the main financial ministries, 
combined with the accountability which democratic governments face for their 
performance to the electorate. The initial comparison provides some preliminary 
support for the claim that this type of regime provides the underlying conditions 
most conducive for stable and sustained growth. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, trends in 
the mean growth rate among bureaucratic democracies is relatively steady, providing 
predictable conditions which are expected to encourage investor confidence, without 
showing the sharp fluctuations and volatility found among other types of regimes. 
[Figures 5.1 and 5.2 about here] 
By contrast, as also predicted by equilibrium theory, compared with all other 
types of regimes, patronage autocracies usually perform most poorly, displaying mean annual 
growth of only 1.23% during these years, half the rate of growth experienced by 
bureaucratic democracies. Patronage autocracies also display the sharpest peaks and 
troughs in their growth rate trends (St. Dev. = 9.88); these types of regimes typically 
occasionally perform very well – or very badly (see Figure 5.2). Thus in the late-1980s 
and the early 1990s, the global recession depressed all economies. The United States 
saw soaring unemployment, massive government budgetary deficits, and a slowdown 
in GDP. But while this downturn almost wiped out growth in bureaucratic 
democracies, patronage autocracies dipped sharply into deeply negative territory.  In 
particular, oil-dependent autocracies are prone to experience sharp swings in GDP 
following large fluctuations in the price of energy, such as the volatility evident in 
Equatorial Guinea, Saddam’s Iraq, and Kuwait. Several states transitioning from 
autocracy and emerging from conflict have also experienced a substantial short-term 
surge in growth under newly-elected regimes, such as Liberia in 1997 and 
Afghanistan in 2002. Investment in infrastructure and economic recovery, funded 
partially by international recovery and reconstruction assistance, generates a sudden 
spike, but long-term growth in these circumstances often proves unsustainable. By 
comparison, both patronage democracies and bureaucratic autocracies fall roughly 
mid-way between the other regime categories, with mean growth rates of 1.93 and 
1.81 percent respectively, as well as proving middling in their overall level of growth 
volatility (see Figure 5.2).  
An alternative way to examine the descriptive evidence is to compare rates of 
growth for states which do not experience any sustained regime change during the 
period under comparison.  Thus we can compare cases classified as stable regimes, 
defined as those which fall into the same regime category in both 1984 and 2007; 
hence Angola, Cameroon, Libya, Syria, Togo and Zimbabwe, for example, are 
classified as stable patronage autocracies; Sri Lanka, Bolivia and Senegal represent 
stable patronage democracies; Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Bahrain and China exemplify 
stable bureaucratic autocracies; and lastly stable bureaucratic democracies during this 
period include states such as Australia, France, Turkey, and Trinidad and Tobago.   
[Figure 5.3 about here] 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the contrasts in income levels and growth rate 
experienced among each of these types of regimes. In 1984, stable bureaucratic 
democracies start with the high average levels of per capita GDP ($17,342), and 
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largest amount of any category, to reach $29,238 per capita in 2007. In 1984 
bureaucratic autocracies were initially even more affluent, with average incomes of 
$31,885. But far from becoming more prosperous, citizens living under these regimes 
experienced falling living standards during these years, to reach $26,223 per capita. 
Patronage democracies start with the lowest average income level of any regime type 
in 1984 ($3,901) and their average income levels rise slightly although still to only 
$5,597. Lastly patronage autocracies were also poor societies in 1984, with per capita 
incomes of only $5,232, and their average income levels fall slightly during recent 
decades. Thus bureaucratic democracies accelerate their lead over all other types of 
regimes, especially widening the disparities with patronage democracies.  In 1984, 
bureaucratic democracies enjoyed average income levels just over three times the 
level of patronage autocracies. By 2007, the equivalent gap had grown to roughly six 
times the level. 
But growth is widely recognized to be the product of many factors beyond 
regime institutions. And in a reciprocal relationship, growing affluence is believed to 
strengthen the quality of democratic governance. Thus these findings should not 
imply be taken to imply that the type of regime necessarily causes growth, due to the 
need for many other controls in multivariate models and the need to address complex 
issues of endogeneity when interpreting this relationship. Rising incomes have been 
regarded as a cause of both growing democratization (through the expansion of the 
middle classes, the Lipset thesis), as well as better governance (through the resources 
invested in the bureaucracy and public demands for services).82 For example, both 
the United States and Mediterranean European countries have been forced to cut 
public services and shrink the size of the public sector workforce employed at local 
and national levels after experiencing an economic downturn, triggered by the 2008 
housing crisis in America, global financial pressures, reduced revenues, and growing 
government budgetary deficits. Thus the recession has had a direct impact on 
governance, by constraining the provision of basic public services, such as schools, 
roads and health care.  
[Table 5.1 about here] 
The simple correlations and the multivariate models presented in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2 examine the core propositions arising from theories about the effects of 
democratic governance controlling for many factors which the literature suggests 
contribute towards prosperity, including geographic variables, prior economic 
conditions, social structural factors, cultural traditions and global trends. The simple 
correlations suggest that multiple factors are significantly associated with growth, 
including many structural conditions which are largely fixed or slowly changing. Thus 
the geographic location of any country (measured by latitude) is strongly correlated 
with rates of economic growth; since location is fixed, this suggests that geography 
helps determine income. Similarly countries which are predominately Muslim 
societies have negative growth rates, suggesting that religious traditions affect the 
economy.  The levels of liberal democracy (R=.038***) and bureaucratic governance 
(R=.083***) are also weakly correlated with growth, although here it is not possible 
to determine the direction of causation in the relationship due to the possibility of 
reciprocal effects and omitted variable bias.  The multivariate regression models lag 
all the independent variables by one year, as a partial control on endogeneity. The 
regression models present the unstandardized beta regression coefficients, their 
significance, and the panel corrected standard errors, along with the number of 
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If we first examine the effects of the controls, factors which are consistently 
positive and significantly related to growth across all models include the location of 
countries (measured in latitude or degrees distant from the equator), trade flows, and 
countries with the legacy of a British colonial background. Latitude is a proxy for 
many other factors affecting the tropics, from climate and agriculture (the availability 
of potential crops and animals) to the prevalence of disease.83  Trade is important for 
growth via closer integration into global markets for exchanging products, services, 
and commodities. Negative factors significantly depressing income across many (not 
all) models include levels of internal conflict; societies experiencing civil wars, 
domestic violence, and instability can be expected to have conditions deterring 
investment, while conflict also destroys essential infrastructure and physical capital, 
increases military expenditure, and reduces the total number of people potentially 
employed in the civilian labor force. In terms of social heterogeneity, linguistic 
fractionalization is consistently negatively related to growth. Religious 
fractionalization also often proves negative but the coefficient is insignificant. 
Easterly and Levine have highlighted the important role of ethnic fractionalization in 
explaining lack of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, although the type of ethnic identity 
and social cleavage appears important for its effects.84 The role of natural resources 
could potentially function as a blessing (by funding investment) or a curse (by 
encouraging corruption and inequality).85 The results in these models confirm the 
latter interpretation; an extensive literature suggests that income arising from oil and 
gas natural resources is often captured by predatory elites, as well as being a cause for 
conflict and instability. Lastly, contra the assumption that human capital contributes 
towards growth, and in line with Easterly’s skeptical view,86 secondary school 
attainment was not consistently and significantly linked to prosperity. 
Democratic governance and growth 
After controlling for these factors, what is the impact of governance? Models 
in Table 5.1 test the main effects suggested by theories of good governance. The 
results demonstrate that after applying the controls, in Model 1a economic growth is 
not significantly affected by neo-liberal measures of good governance (including the 
World Bank Institute’s estimates of rule of law, property rights and control of 
corruption), nor in Model 1b by bureaucratic governance alone (as monitored by the 
ICRG).  These results are contrary to those presented by Evans and Rausch, but their 
analysis of Weberian governance was restricted to three dozen developing 
countries.87 When both liberal democracy and bureaucratic governance are entered into model 1c, 
however, both emerge as significant predictors of economic growth. Equilibrium theory posits that 
it is important to counterbalance the accountability of elected officials for the 
country’s economic performance with the capacity of the public sector to manage the 
economy effectively, and the results lend support to this argument. This model shows 
that both these factors have effects which are similar in strength; an improvement of 
10% in the 100-point scales of liberal democracy and bureaucratic governance 
increases annual per capita growth in GDP by roughly 0.2 or 0.3% higher 
respectively. This may appear to be a relatively modest impact in itself, but since 
average growth rates for all countries throughout these years is 1.9%, the rise is not 
inconsiderable. 
[Table 5.1 and 5.2 about here] 
A similar series of models in table 5.2 examine the impact of democracy 
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results in Model 2a demonstrate that after applying the same range of controls, liberal 
democracy, by itself, has no direct impact on growth. A robustness check, replicating the 
models but substituting the Polity IV standardized democracy scale, produced a 
similar result. These results are contrary to the conclusion of Halperin et al, based on 
comparing the economic performance of least developed nations but failing to 
control for many factors driving both democratization and growth.88 At the same 
time, the results provide further confirmation for the findings reported in many 
previous studies which are skeptical about the link between democracy and growth, 
including studies published by Barro, Przeworski et al, and Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu.89 There are many reasons why the assumed mechanism of electoral 
accountability may fail, so that governments may be returned to office, despite a poor 
economic performance, or they may be kicked out despite growing prosperity.  In 
liberal democracies, the chains of accountability linking citizens with representatives 
are complex. In systems with divided government and power-sharing arrangements, it 
is difficult to assign praise or blame for macroeconomic management.  Government 
survival during inter-electoral periods depends upon parliamentary support, as well as 
popular votes.  Voters can cast their ballots based on many reasons unconnected with 
past or future economic performance.  The general public may find it difficult, or 
even impossible, to evaluate more technical and abstract economic conditions (such 
as the size of the government deficit, the level of any trade imbalance, or the 
international strength of the currency), still less to attribute praise or blame for these 
conditions.  Citizens’ evaluations of many aspects of economic performance, where 
they lack direct pocket-book experience, are framed by the news media. Parties are 
accountable to members and partisan supporters, as well as the general public.  90 
Given the complexity of assigning responsibility for economic management in long-
established democracies, where parties and leaders have established a long-track 
record over successive administrations, it is not surprising if this accountability 
proves even weaker in many countries where parties and leaders have not yet 
established a strong reputation which could form a rational basis for retrospective 
economic voting. Moreover even if the chain of accountability works perfectly, so 
that politicians are accountable for their handling of the economy, and they have 
every intention of serving the public interest, this does not mean, by any means, that 
they can necessarily deliver on their economic promises if states lack the technical 
capacity to do so. 
Model 2b examines the impact of several of the core institutions associated 
with power-sharing arrangements. If institutional effects on growth are conditional, 
then growth is expected to vary according to whether states are federal or unified, 
whether electoral systems are proportional or majoritarian, and whether the type of 
executive is parliamentary or presidential, although the direction of any institutional 
effects is not easy to predict from existing theories. Model 2b in Table 5.2 
demonstrates complex results after applying all the prior controls. In particular, the 
comparison of parliamentary executives in all the countries under comparison shows 
a strong and significant impact on growth, as Persson and Tabellini have reported. 91 
Countries with either mixed executives (combining a presidency and prime minister) 
or with a pure presidential executive generally have lower prosperity than 
parliamentary systems. Overall these general findings serve to support the argument 
that parliamentary executives usually strengthen collective accountability; in these 
systems, where responsibility for managing the economy rests with the party or 
parties in government, it is easier for electors to assess economic performance and to 
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executives, when given the opportunity to choose leaders at the ballot box, it is more 
difficult for citizens to assign clear-cut praise or blame for economic conditions.     
Similarly the direct effects of proportional representation electoral systems are also 
significantly related to income, further confirming Knutsen’s conclusions.92 By 
contrast, federalism does not appear to have a direct effect on economic 
performance. Yet the exact reasons for these patterns are not apparent theoretically, 
since power-sharing theories predict interaction effects, emphasizing the role of 
democratic institutions. Contrary to the direction predicted by consociational 
arguments, in fact the interaction effect between liberal democracy and parliamentary 
executives proved weakly negative. The other interaction effects from institutions in 
power-sharing democracies were insignificant.   
Lastly, model 2c in Table 5.2 tests the argument that democracy has an 
indirect effect on growth since this type of regime typically makes a greater 
investment in human capital than autocracies. Human capital has many dimensions 
and it is measured here by gross enrollment (male and female) in secondary 
schooling. The interaction effect of democracy and human capital on growth emerges 
as significant but negative, in the contrary direction to that predicted theoretically. 
There are reasons to be skeptical about the assumed importance of human capital for 
growth, for instance William Easterly suggests that the dramatic expansion in 
schooling and literacy experienced in many developing countries during the last four 
decades have, in fact, proved distinctly disappointing for raising incomes.93 Creating 
skills in the workforce is insufficient for prosperity, he argues, if societies continue to 
lack access to new technologies, or if there are few job openings for skilled workers 
and high levels of long-term unemployment. Moreover growth may come through 
alternative strategies; hence Przeworski et al found that democratic and autocratic 
regimes achieved prosperity through different routes.   The study confirmed that 
among wealthier nations, democracies were more likely to invest in human capital 
(including education and training).  But this did not necessarily generate a better 
economic performance, since wealthier autocracies achieve equivalent gains in 
productivity and growth through the alternative mechanism of higher fertility rates, 
which expanded the overall size of their workforce population. 
IV: Conclusions and Implications 
The varied thinkers subscribing to an ‘idealist’ viewpoint commonly make 
two core claims favoring democratic governance. Firstly, idealists argue on normative 
grounds that legitimate governance is based on the will of the people, as expressed 
through the institutions of liberal democracy. These claims are embodied in 
international conventions, agreed by the world’s governments, notably Article 21 of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights:  “The will of the people shall be the basis 
of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.” Human rights-based arguments reflect universal claims. Rights-based 
arguments reflect powerful moral arguments which resonate widely among those 
sharing democratic values. Realists also suggest that ‘good’ governance is intrinsically 
valuable; in this view, states should reflect the principles of clean, efficient, and 
effective public administration, rule of law, and impartial decision-making.   
Confronted by those who remain skeptical about these claims, however, the second 
strand of the idealist and realist arguments suggest that democratic governance is not 
only of intrinsic value, but this type of regime also has instrumental benefits. The way 
that leaders are chosen and held accountable by citizens, idealists believe, has NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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important consequences for whether they act in the public interest. Similarly states 
which are more competent, effective and efficient when steering the economy are 
more likely to produce stable growth and security, acting as partners for achieving 
developmental goals in conjunction with the international community. 
The evidence which help to determine institutional effects is complex to 
analyze, not least due to problems of missing data, reciprocal causation, limited 
country coverage, and the challenges of conceptual validity for many common 
indices. This study has sought to throw fresh light on these issues, building upon the 
argument that neither liberal democracy nor good governance, in isolation, can be 
expected to generate conditions for sustained growth, although the combination of 
these characteristics is predicted to prove important for prosperity. The result of the 
analysis lends confirmation to this argument, while also casting serious doubt on 
several alternative theories. The equilibrium thesis emphasizes that both liberal 
democracy and governance capacity need to be strengthened simultaneously for 
effective development, within the constraints posed by structural conditions.   
Democracy and governance are separate phenomena but their combination is 
necessary (although not sufficient) to achieve progress. Liberal democracy is 
theorized as critical for development, by allowing citizens to express their demands, 
to hold public officials to account, and to rid themselves of incompetent, corrupt or 
ineffective leaders. Yet rising public demands which elected officials cannot meet is a 
recipe for frustration – or worse. In this sense, the issue is not simply about 
providing electoral incentives so that vote-seeking politicians pay attention to social 
needs but also providing elected leaders with the capacity to implement effective 
policies. Thus the quality of governance is also predicted to play a vital role in 
development, where the notion of ‘good governance’ is understood in terms of 
expanding the capacity of elected representatives and officials to manage the delivery 
of basic public goods and services, so that leaders can respond effectively to citizen’s 
demands. Nevertheless the quality of both democracy and governance are not 
isolated phenomena; regimes reflect, as well as shape, the enduring structural 
conditions in each society. The international development community, national 
governments, and civil society organizations have devoted growing resources to 
strengthening democracy and governance. The difficult and complex challenge facing 
reformers is therefore to develop simultaneously both the institutions of liberal 
democracy and good governance, within the structural constraints of each society, 
rather than prioritizing one or the other of these twin development goals. 
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Figure 5.1: Annual growth in income by type of regime  
 
Note: Mean annual growth of income per capita in purchasing power parity from the 
chain series index of the Penn World Tables, 1984-2007. For the regime typology, see 
Appendix A. 
   NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
 
22 
 
Figure 5.2: Mean rate of growth 1980-2010 by type of regime 
Note: Mean annual growth of income per capita in purchasing power parity (constant 
prices) from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables, 1980-2010. For the regime 
typology, see Appendix A.  
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Figure 5.3: Growth by type of regime   
  
Note: Mean annual growth of income per capita in purchasing power parity from the 
chain series index of the Penn World Tables, 1984-2007. For the regime typology, see 
Appendix A.  NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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Table 5.1: The impact of governance upon economic growth 
Models   1a 1b 1c 
 Economic  growth 
correlations 
Good governance 
institutions 
Bureaucratic 
governance 
Democratic 
governance 
 R  p  b  p  PCSE  b  p  PCSE  b  p  PCSE 
REGIME EFFECTS                  
Liberal democracy (FH)   .038 ***    .023 *  .014 
Bureaucratic governance (ICRG)   .083 ***  -.003   .007  .032 *  .016 
Good governance (Rule of law, property 
rights and control of corruption) 
-.026   -.188   .143       
CONTROLS                  
Economic                  
Trade flows  .092  *** .032  *  .014 .029  ***  .006  .029  **
* 
.006 
Income (Per capita GDP) .040 ***  .001   .000 .001  .000      .000 
Geographic                  
Location (Latitude)  .063  *** 6.75  *
*
* 
.642 2.36 **  .633  3.13 **
* 
.798 
Area size (Sq.Km)  -.018    -.001    .000 .001    .000  -.001    .000 
Natural resources (Oil/gas rents)  .008    -.001    .000 .001    .000  -.001    .000 
Social Structure                    
Linguistic fractionalization  -.039  *** -.244    .854 -.575  * .203  -.259   .227 
Religious  fractionalization .000   .681    .793 -.125    .424  -.026    .427 
Human capital (secondary schooling)  .053  *** .001    .011 -.008   .005  -.005    .005 
Logged population size  -.005    .247    .380 .714  ***  .149  .672    .147 
Internal conflict  -.058  *** .238    .453 -.104   .242  -.077    .249 
Cultural traditions                   
Muslim society  -.038  *** 1.45  *  .779 .282   .461  .319    .434 
British colonial legacy  -.012    .959  *
*
* 
.290 .611 ***  .130  .580 **
* 
.129 
Global trends                   
Year  .042  *** -.094    .105 -.004    .030  -.009    .031 
R-2     .085 
508 
103 
5 
.030 
1769 
95 
20 
.030 
1769 
95 
20 
Number of observations  5767   
Number of countries     
Years 20   
Note: The models present the unstandardized beta coefficients and the statistical significance of Ordinary Least Squares linear 
regression models with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The dependent variable is income per capita in purchasing power parity 
from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables. *** p <0.001, ** p <0 .001, * p < 0.05. For details of all the variables, see 
the technical appendix.  NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE                                                                         9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
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Table 5.2: The impact of democracy upon economic growth  
Model 2a  2b  2c 
 Liberal  Democracy Power-sharing 
Institutions 
Democracy and 
Human Capital 
 b p PCSE b p PCSE b p PCSE
REGIME EFFECTS    
Liberal democracy (FH)  -.004 .003 .017 ** .005 .016 *  .007
Liberal democracy * human capital   -.001 ***  .000
Federal state (1) Unitary (0) -.543 .587     
PR electoral systems (1)/ Majoritarian or mixed 
(0)
1.73 *** .007    
Parliamentary Executive (1)/ Other (0) 4.69 *** 1.36    
Liberal democracy * federal state -.014   .007     
Liberal democracy * PR electoral  system -.014   .006   
Liberal democracy * Parliamentary Executive -.022 *** .013    
CONTROLS     
Economic     
Trade flows .032 ***  .004 .030 *** .004  .030  *** .004
Income (Per capita GDP) .001 .000 .001 * .000  .001  * .000
Geographic       
Location (Latitude) 1.99 ** .527 1.78 *  .567  2.14  *** .547
Area size (Sq.Km) .001 .000 -.000 .000  .001    .000
Natural resources (Oil/gas rents) -.001 *** .000 -.001 *** .000 -.001 ***  .000
Social Structure     
Linguistic fractionalization -.878 *** .242 -.196 .261  -.628 *  .290
Religious fractionalization -.450 .257 -.448 .331  -.259    .295
Human capital (secondary schooling) -.011 ** .005 -.011 .005 .008   .101
Logged population size .568 *** .129 .442 *  .194  .546  ***  .127
Internal conflict -.015 * .241 -.485 *  .262  -.579  ** .246
Cultural traditions           
Muslim society .510 * .344 .300  .359  .013   .336
British colonial legacy .586 *** .166 .678 ** .208 .549 ***  .170
Global trends      
Year -.039 *** .013 -.050 *** .013 -.040  ***  .012
R-2 .027 
3,071 
103 
32 
.031 
3,038 
102 
32 
.029 
3,071 
103 
32 
Number of observations 
Number of countries 
Years 
Note: The models present the unstandardized beta coefficients and the statistical significance of Ordinary Least Squares linear 
regression models with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The dependent variable is income per capita in purchasing power parity 
from the chain series index of the Penn World Tables. *** p <0.001, ** p <0 .001, * p < 0.05. For details of all the variables, see 
the technical appendix. 
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Appendix A: Description of the variables and data sources 
Name Description  and  source 
Liberal Democracy index  The Gastil index, the 7-point scale used by Freedom House, measuring political rights and civil liberties annually 
since 1972. The index is standardized to a 100-point scale. 
Source: Freedom House. Freedom in the World www.Freedomhouse.com. 
Bureaucratic Governance   Political Risk Service’s Group (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide estimates of the Quality of Governance. 
Based on expert assessments, the PRSG’s Quality of Government index combines three components: (1) 
Bureaucratic Quality; (2) Corruption, and; (3) Law and Order. The index is standardized to a 100 point scale. 
Source: The Quality of Government Dataset, the QOG Institute, University of Goteborg May 2010 release. 
Regime classification  The regime classification is based on the liberal democracy index and the bureaucratic governance index which 
are both standardized to 100 point scales and dichotomized around the mean to create a four-fold typology 
distinguishing regimes which are bureaucratic democracies, bureaucratic autocracies, patronage democracies and 
patronage democracies. For details see chapter 4   Pippa Norris. Democratic Governance and Human development: 
Prosperity, Welfare and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012). 
Economic growth  Annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP based on constant local prices.  
Source: Penn World Tables. 
Geographic location  The absolute value of the latitude from the equator of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 
and 1). Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999 
Internal armed conflict  ‘Internal armed conflict’ is defined as that which occurs between the government of a state and one or more 
internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.  The UCDP measure is coded one a 4-point 
ordinal scale depending upon the incidence and magnitude of conflict (depending upon the number of battle-
related deaths): (0) no interstate conflict; (1) minor interstate armed conflict; (2) Interstate intermediate armed 
conflict; and (4) Interstate war. The measure is recoded into a binary dummy (0/1) variable indicating the 
incidence of internal armed conflict above the minimum threshold irrespective of magnitude. 
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset V4.0 1946-2007 
Income  Per Capita GDP measured in constant international $ in Purchasing Power Parity.  Various years.  
Source: Penn World Tables.
Area size  Area of the nation-state in kilometers Source: Banks CNTS dataset 
Natural resources  Natural resources are operationalized as oil and gas rents per capita. This represents the total annual value of a 
country’s oil and gas production, minus the extraction costs in each country, divided by its population to 
normalize the value of the rents, measured from 1960 to 2002 in constant 2000 US dollars.  
Source: Michael Ross (2004) 
Human  capital  Gross enrollment ratio in secondary education is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. Secondary education 
completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for 
lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more 
specialized teachers. Source: World Development Indicators 
Muslim society  Predominant religious faith in each society. Source: CIA The World Factbook  www.cia.gov 
Linguistic fractionalization  The share of languages spoken as ‘mother tongues’ in each country, generally derived from national census data, 
as reported in the Encyclopedia Britannica 2001. The fractionalization index is computed as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group share, reflecting the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
from a population belonged to different groups. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg 
2003. 
Religious fractionalization  The share of the population adhering to different religions in each country, as reported in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2001 and related sources. The fractionalization index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index 
of ethnoreligious group share, reflecting the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belonged to different groups. 
Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg 2003. 
Trade Flows  Economic trade and investment flows  Source: KOF (2008) 
Logged population size  This estimates the total population per state (thousands) (logged). Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
BritCol   The past colonial history of countries was classified into those which shared a British colonial background (1), 
and all others (0). Source: CIA The World Factbook  www.cia.gov 
PR Electoral systems  The type of electoral systems used for the lower house of the national parliament. Majoritarian formulas include 
First-Past-the-Post, Second Ballot, the Block vote, the Single Non-Transferable Vote, and the Alternative Vote. 
Proportional formulas are defined to include Party List as well as the Single Transferable Vote systems. 
Combined (or ‘mixed’) formulas use both majoritarian and proportional ballots for election to the same body. 
Countries using proportional formulas are coded into a dummy variable (1/0). 
Sources: International IDEA. Handbook of Electoral System design, 2nd ed. 2005; Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy
Federal state  Federal states (coded 1) are either federations or decentralized unions. Federations are defined as compound 
polities where the directly elected constituent units possess independent powers in the exercise of their 
legislative, fiscal and administrative responsibilities. Decentralized unions are those where constituent units of 
government work through the common organs of government although constitutionally-protected subunits of 
government have some functional autonomy. All states which are not either federations or decentralized unions 
are coded as unitary states (coded 0). 
Sources: Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy, Watts. Comparing Federal Systems 1999, Banks, Muller and Overstreet. 
Political Handbook of the World 2000-2002. 
Type  of  executive  The type of executive was classified as parliamentary, mixed or presidential.  Source: Norris. 2008. Driving 
Democracy 
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Note: This paper is drawn from a larger book manuscript, “Democratic Governance and Human Development: Prosperity, 
Welfare and Peace” (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012). More details and draft chapters are 
available at www.pippanorris.com. 
                                                            
1 Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones. 1999. ‘Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than 
others?’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 83-116; Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 
2004.  ‘Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development.’ 
Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-165; Dani Rodrik. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
2 John Geering and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. ‘Political institutions and corruption: The role of unitarism and 
parliamentarism.’ British Journal of Political Science 34: 295-330; H.E. Sung. 2004. ‘Democracy and political corruption: 
A cross-national comparison.’ Crime, Law and Social Change 41: 179. 
3 Vasudha Chhotray and David Hulme. 2009. ‘Contrasting Visions for Aid and Governance in the 21st Century: The 
White House Millennium Challenge Account and DFID’s Drivers of Change.’ World Development 37(1): 36-49. 
4 Edward Newman and Roland Rich. Eds. 2004. The UN Role in Promoting Democracy. New York: United Nations 
University Press. 
5 http://www.undp.org/annualreport2011/democratic_governance.html 
6 For literature reviews, see Hristos Doucouliagos, and Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu. 2008. ‘Democracy and economic 
growth: A meta-analysis.’  American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 61-83; Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda. 2009. 
‘Review article: Good governance, institutions and economic development: Beyond the conventional wisdom.’ 
British Journal of Political Science 40: 195-224. 
7 See, for example, Dani Rodrik, A. Subramanian, F. Trebbi. 2004.  ‘Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions 
over geography and integration in economic development.’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-165. 
8 See, for example, Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andre Shleifer. 2004. ‘Do 
institutions cause growth?’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271-303; Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. 2007. 
‘Growth and governance: Models, measures, and mechanisms.’ Journal of Politics 69(2): 538-554; Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2008. ‘Income and democracy.’ American Economic Review 98(3): 808-842; 
Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente. 2010. ‘Does democracy produce quality of government?’ European Journal of 
Political Research 49: 443-470. 
9 R. Levine  and D. Renelt. 1992. ‘A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions.’ American Economic 
Review 82(4): 942-963; James L. Butkiewicz and Halit Yanikkaya. 2006. ‘Institutional quality and economic growth: 
Maintenance of the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both?’ Economic Modelling 23(4): 648-661. 
10 For textbooks approaches, see, Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2003. Economic Growth. 2nd Edition. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; Rick Szostak. 2009. The causes of economic growth: interdisciplinary perspectives. 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
11 Douglas North. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Dani Rodrik, A. Subramanian, F. Trebbi. 2004.  ‘Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography 
and integration in economic development.’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-165; R. Rigobon and Dani Rodrik. 
2005.  ‘Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income: Estimating the interrelationships.’  Economics of Transition 13 
(3): 533-564. 
12 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. ‘The colonial origins of comparative 
development: an empirical investigation.’ The American Economic Review 91 (5):1369-401; Daron Acemoglu, Simon 
Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. ‘Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the 
modern income distribution.’ The Quarterly Journal of Econometrics 118:1231-94; Daron Acemoglu, and James A. 
Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
13 Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. 2007. ‘Growth and governance: Models, measures, and mechanisms.’ 
Journal of Politics 69(2): 538-554. 
14 Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andre Shleifer. 2004. ‘Do institutions cause 
growth?’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271-303. 
15 See Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente. 2010. ‘Does democracy produce quality of government?’ European 
Journal of Political Research 49: 443-470. 
16 Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda. 2009. ‘Review article: Good governance, institutions and economic 
development: Beyond the conventional wisdom.’ British Journal of Political Science 40: 195-224. NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE   9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
17 Robert J. Barro. 1996. ‘Democracy and growth.’ Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1): 1–27; Robert J. Barro. 1997. 
Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge: The MIT Press.  
18 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 1996. ‘What makes 
democracies endure?’ Journal of Democracy 7:1: 39-55; Adam Przeworski, and F. Limongi.1997. ‘Modernization: 
theories and facts.’ World Politics 49:155–183; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and 
Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
19 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press 
20 Hristos Doucouliagos, and Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu. 2008. ‘Democracy and economic growth: A meta-analysis.’  
American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 61-83.  
21 See, for example, William Easterly. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Chapter 11 
and 12. 
22  John Williamson. 1990. ‘What Washington means for policy reform.’ In Latin American Adjustment: How much has 
Happened? Ed. John Williamson. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics; J. Marangos. 2009. ‘The 
evolution of the term 'Washington consensus.' Journal of Economic Surveys 23(2): 350-384. 
23 John Williamson  and Pedro-Pablo (Editors) 2003. After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in 
Latin America. Peterson Institute; Francisco Panizz. 2009.  Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy beyond 
the Washington Consensus. London: Zed Books. 
24 Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi. Eds.1999. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance. New 
York: United Nations University Press; H. Z. Li and Z. H. Xu. 2007. ‘Economic Convergence in Seven Asian 
Economies.’ Review of Development Economics 11 (3): 531-49; F. K. W. Loh. 2008. ‘Procedural Democracy, Participatory 
Democracy and Regional Networking: The Multi-Terrain Struggle for Democracy in Southeast Asia.’ Inter-Asia 
Cultural Studies 9, (1): 127-41. 
25 Joseph E. Stigletz. 2010. Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company;  
26 John Williamson. 1990. ‘What Washington means for policy reform.’ In Latin American Adjustment: How Much has 
Happened? Ed. John Williamson. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics; J. Marangos. 2009. ‘The 
evolution of the term 'Washington consensus.' Journal of Economic Surveys 23(2): 350-384. 
27 Douglas North. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
28 Paulo Mauro. 1995. ‘Corruption and growth.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 681-712. 
29 P. Bardhan. 1997. ‘Corruption and development: A review of issues.’ Journal of Economic Literature 35   (3): 1320-
1346; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; A. Brunetti  and B. Weder. 2003. ‘A free press is bad news for corruption.’ Journal of 
Public Economics 87 (7–8): 1801–24; Alan Doig. 2000. Corruption and Democratization. London: Frank Cass. 
30 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer. 1995. ‘Institutions and economic performance: Cross-Country tests using 
alternative institutional measures.’ Economics and Politics 7(3): 207-27. 
31 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
Analytical Issues. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute. www.govindicators.org 
32 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators, 1996-2006. Washington DC: The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper; Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. ‘Growth and governance: A rejoinder.’ Journal of Politics 69 
(2): 570-572. 
33 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. ‘The colonial origins of comparative 
development: an empirical investigation.’ The American Economic Review 91 (5):1369-401; Daron Acemoglu, Simon 
Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. ‘Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the 
modern income distribution.’ The Quarterly Journal of Econometrics 118:1231-94; Daron Acemoglu, and James A. 
Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
34 Dani Rodrik, A. Subramanian, F. Trebbi. 2004.  ‘Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and 
integration in economic development.’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-165; R. Rigobon and Dani Rodrik. 2005.  NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE   9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
‘Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income: Estimating the interrelationships.’  Economics of Transition 13 (3): 533-
564. 
35 Joseph E. Stigletz. 1989. The Economic Role of the State. Oxford: Blackwell; Joseph E. Stigletz. 2006. Making 
Globalization Work. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
36 Francis Fukuyama. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
37 Francis Fukuyama. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. pp.26-29. 
38 Peter Evans  and J.E. Rauch. 1999. ‘Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of 'Weberian' 
state structures on economic growth.’ American Sociological Review 64(5): 748-765. 
39 Alice Amsden. 1989. Asia’s Next Giant. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Alice Amsden. 2001. The Rise of the ‘Rest’: 
Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Robert Wade. 1990. Governing 
the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; Francis Fukuyama. 2007. ‘Liberalism versus state-building.’  Journal of Democracy   18 (3):10-13; Young Whan 
Kihl. 2005. Transforming Korean politics: democracy, reform, and culture. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 
40 See Carl A. Trocki. 2006. Singapore: wealth, power and the culture of control. New York: Routledge; Diane K. Mauzy and 
R.S. Milne. 2002. Singapore politics under the People’s Action Party. New York: Routledge. 
41 Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP, current international dollars, as 
estimated by the IMF. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx 
42 Martin King Whyte. 2009. ‘Paradoxes of China's economic boom.’ Annual Review of Sociology 35: 371-392. 
43 David Kang. 2002. Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines New York: Cambridge 
University Press. The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, however, ranks the 
Republic of Korea as 39th (best) out of 178 countries worldwide, placed in a similar ranking to Malta and Costa Rica.  
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results 
44 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2010. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies 
Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge. 2nd edition. p15. 
45 Francis Fukuyama. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.p28. 
46 Anthony Downs. 1997. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Addison Wesley; Morris Fiorina. 1981. 
Retrospective Voting  in American National Elections New Haven: Yale; Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1988. Economics & 
Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
47 Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1990. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press; Christopher J. Anderson. 1995. Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European 
Democracies. New York: M.E. Sharpe; G. Bingham Powell and G.D. Whitten. 1993. ‘A cross-national analysis of 
economic voting: Taking account of the political context.’ American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 391-414; G. 
Bingham Powell. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
48 Wouter van der Brug, Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. 2007. The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and 
Elections in Fifteen Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
49 Donald Wittman. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
50 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2010. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies 
Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge. 2nd edition. P.48. 
51 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2010. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies 
Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge. 2nd edition p.32. 
52 Guillermo O’Donnell. 1979. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley, 
CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 
53 Robert J. Barro. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge: The MIT Press. NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE   9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
54 Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake. 2003. ‘The political economy of growth: Democracy and human capital.’  
American Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 333-347; David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter. 2004. ‘Democracy and human 
capital formation.’ Comparative Political Studies 37(7): 842-64. 
55 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2010. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies 
Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge. 2nd edition. P.39. 
56 Robert J. Barro, 2001. ‘Human capital and growth.’ American Economic Review 91(2): 12-17. 
57 Robert J. Barro, 1999. ‘Determinants of democracy.’ Journal of Political Economy 107 (6): 158–183.  
58 Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4; Pippa Norris. 2009. 
Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
59 Arend Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Peter Cowhey and Stephen 
Haggard. 2001. Presidents, Parliaments and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Torsten Persson and Guido 
Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2011. 
‘Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic growth.’ Electoral Studies 30(1): 83-
90; Stefan Voigt. 2011. ‘Positive constitutional economics II: A survey of recent developments.’ Public Choice 146(1-
2): 205-256. 
60 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 2004. ‘Constitutions and economic policy.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 18: 75-
98; Torsten Persson. 2006. ‘Democracy and development: The devil in the details.’  American Economic Review 96: 319. 
61 Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2011. ‘Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic 
growth.’ Electoral Studies 30(1): 83-90. 
62 Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
63 John Geering and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. ‘Political institutions and corruption: The role of unitarism and 
parliamentarism.’ British Journal of Political Science 34: 295-330. 
64 Christopher D. Anderson. 2006. ‘Economic voting and multilevel governance: A comparative individual-level 
analysis.’ American Journal Of Political Science 50: 449+; M.A. Kayser and Christopher Wlezien. 2011. ‘Performance 
pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote.’ European Journal of Political Research 50(3): 365-394. 
65 Arend Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
66 Yi Feng. 2003. Democracy, Governance and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 
67 For more details about this argument, see chapter 2.   Pippa Norris. Democratic Governance and Human development: 
Prosperity, Welfare and Peace New York: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2012). 
68 Pippa Norris. 2011. Democratic Deficit. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
69 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2008. ‘Income and democracy.’ American Economic 
Review 98(3): 808-842.    
70 Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. ‘Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political 
legitimacy.’ American Political Science Review. 53: 69-105.  
71 See also Dankwart Rustow. 1970. ‘Transitions to democracy.’ Comparative Politics 2: 337-63. 
72 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2008. ‘Income and democracy.’ American Economic 
Review 98(3): 808-842. See also Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andre Shleifer. 
2004. ‘Do institutions cause growth?’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271-303. 
73 David Dollar and V. Levine. ‘The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2003.’ World Development 34(12): 2034-
2046. 
74 See, however, Torsten Persson, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press; Torsten Persson.  2006. ‘Democracy and development: The devil in the details.’  American Economic 
Review 96: 319. 
75 Geraldo L. Munck.  2009. Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
76 Anne Mette Kjaer. 2010. Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. NORRIS APSA 2011: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE   9/12/2011 2:00 PM 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
77 Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. 2007. ‘Growth and governance: Models, measures, and mechanisms.’ 
Journal of Politics 69(2): 538-554; C.R. Apaza. 2009. ‘Measuring governance and corruption through the worldwide 
governance indicators: Critiques, responses, and ongoing scholarly discussion.’  PS-Political Science & Politics 42(1): 
139-143. 
78 Stephen Haggard and Lydia Tiede. 2011.  ‘The rule of law and economic growth: where are we?’  World 
Development 39 (5):  673-685. 
79 For details see chapter 4   Pippa Norris. Democratic Governance and Human development: Prosperity, Welfare and Peace 
New York: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2012). 
80 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
81 Institutions are classified from Pippa Norris. 2009. Driving Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
82 Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente. 2010. ‘Does democracy produce quality of government?’ European Journal 
of Political Research 49: 443-470. 
83 Jared M. Diamond. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.W. Norton. 
84 William Easterly and R. Levine.1997. ‘Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions.’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 111 (4): 1203-1250. 
85 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Eds. 2007. Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
86 William Easterly. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Chapter 4. 
87 Peter Evans  and J.E. Rauch. 1999. ‘Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of 'Weberian' 
state structures on economic growth.’ American Sociological Review 64(5): 748-765. 
88 Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2010. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies 
Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge. 2nd edition. P.39. 
89 Robert J. Barro. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge: The MIT Press; 
Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press;   
Hristos Doucouliagos, and Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu. 2008. ‘Democracy and economic growth: A meta-analysis.’  
American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 61-83. 
90 Jose Maria Maravall and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca. Eds. 2008. Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions and 
Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
91 Torsten Persson  and Guido Tabellini. 2004. ‘Constitutions and economic policy.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 
18(1): 75-98. 
92 Henrik Knutsen. 2011. ‘Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic growth.’ 
Electoral Studies 30(1): 83-90. 
93 William Easterly. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Chapter 4. 